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Abstract
Previous research has shown that negative attitudes towards immigrants and support for
anti-immigrant parties are observed both among those experiencing relative deprivation
and those experiencing relative gratification (so called v-curve). Whereas the effect of rela-
tive deprivation is intuitive, the effect of relative gratification is more difficult to explain. Why
would economic prosperity provoke negative attitudes towards immigrants? We first pres-
ent correlational (Study 1) and experimental (Study 2) support for the v-curve. In Study 1, in
a national Swiss referendum, a higher percentage anti-immigrant voting was found in can-
tons with relatively lower and relatively higher relative disposable income. In Study 2, in a
hypothetical society, more opposition to ‘newcomers’ joining society was found among poor
or above average wealth group members than among those in a moderate wealth group
condition. In Study 3, we replicate this finding and also show that opposition to immigration
is higher for all wealth groups when societal inequality is growing rather than declining. In a
final study, we examine different forms of relative gratification and mediators of the relation-
ship between relative gratification and opposition to immigration (i.e., identification, collec-
tive self-definition as competent and cold, and fear about future wealth). Only fear about
future wealth mediates this relationship. We conclude that, paradoxically, relative gratifica-
tion effects are partly due to the fear of future deprivation.
Introduction
Groups openly advocating anti-immigrant sentiments have made a remarkable comeback in
recent years in OECD countries. This trend, which began in the 1980s, can even be witnessed
in countries where multiculturalism was once celebrated as a core value defining the national
identity. Consider the Netherlands, where the PVV (Party for Freedom) led by Geert Wilders
increased its number of seats in parliament from 9 seats in 2006 to 24 in the 2010 elections.
Another case in point is Sweden, where, for the first time in the country’s history, the extreme
right secured a seat in the national parliament in the 2010 elections.
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Attempts to understand the rise of support for anti-immigrant parties traditionally focus on
macro-economic downturn (such as the 1930s Great Depression and rapid post-war industrial
modernization) and poor people or working class people. This is because realistic conflict and
competition over scarce resources is experienced most strongly in such an economic climate
[1], and among those with a lower economic position in society [2–7]. While we do not dispute
that economic downturn or poverty can contribute to anti-immigrant sentiments, there is a
growing body of work that suggests that this relationship is not as straightforward as often
believed. In particular, while there is considerable evidence that economic downturn can be
associated with harsh attitudes towards immigrants, there is also evidence for the opposite: that
economic prosperity can produce harsh attitudes towards minorities—so called relative gratifi-
cation [8]. Similarly, while negative attitudes towards minorities are at times more pronounced
among the poor and working classes, such attitudes are under some conditions particularly
prevalent among the wealthier groups in society, or those who expect prosperity in the future
[9–11]. Indeed, while support for anti-immigrant parties flourished after the Global Financial
Crisis (GFC), many commentators have noted that the rise of support for extreme right in
Western Europe started long before the GFC—at a time when the economy in most Eurozone
countries was booming and, relatively speaking, people saw their income and affluence increase
[12–14].
To illuminate these opposing processes, we take a two-pronged approach. We start by dem-
onstrating empirically that both relative deprivation and relative gratification processes relate
to opposition to immigration. Second, in an attempt to better understand relative gratification
processes, we examine (a) whether the v-curve is affected by socio-structural changes relating
to societal inequality, (b) the forms of relative gratification that are related to opposition to
immigration, and (c) mediators underlying the relationship between relative gratification and
opposition to immigration. In line with Guimond and Dambrun [9], we define relative depri-
vation as a group’s perception that it is deprived in comparison to a particular standard or
compared to a relevant outgroup. In contrast, relative gratification is the experience that the
group is better off compared to a particular standard or a relevant other group. We begin by
reviewing past research on the way economic performance affects prejudice and opposition to
immigration.
Hard times = harsh attitudes?
The idea that economic hardship fuels negative attitudes towards minorities forms the basis for
theorizing in social psychology, political science and sociology. Both realistic conflict ([15–17];
see [18] for a meta-analysis) and relative deprivation theorising [19] leads to the predication
that, when confronted with economic hardship, people ‘lash out’ at minorities—in particular
those minorities who appear to be competing for resources or are perceived to be the cause of
relative deprivation (see also frustration-aggression reasoning and scapegoat theory, [20]).
Consistent with this, political economy researchers have argued that attitudes towards immi-
grants are conditioned by the extent to which immigrants are perceived to threaten material
self-interest [21, 22].
At a societal level, there is considerable evidence for this relationship, both in Europe [23]
and in North America [24, 25]. Economic downturns have also been associated with an
increased propensity to vote for parties voicing anti-immigration sentiments and an increase in
anti-immigrant attitudes more generally [4, 26–34]. There is now also a considerable body of
literature showing that poor uneducated manual workers are one category of voters to be
drawn to extreme right wing parties with anti-immigrant agendas [27, 31, 35] and to hold
more negative attitudes towards immigrants than their wealthier counterparts [6]. In sum, it
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appears that it is during harsh economic times, and among income groups experiencing harsh
conditions that we encounter harsh attitudes towards minorities.
However, even though such findings appear to explain some instances of prejudice, it is also
clear that there are many cases where realistic conflict, self-interest and relative deprivation
theorising fail to explain opposition to immigration. For one, some claims are poorly supported
on closer inspection [36–38]. Indeed, on the basis of their review of the literature in the field,
Hainmueller and Hopkins [37] conclude that “the significant majority of prior work finds that
labor market competition does not shape attitudes [towards immigrants] of the mass public”
(p.240). This state of affairs led to Ceobanu and Escandell [39] to recommend that it is time to
move beyond theorising that explains anti-immigrant attitudes solely by pointing to individual
and group-level competition and threat.
It is also worth considering classic work by Hovland and Sears [40] purportedly showing
that in the period between 1882 and 1930, low cotton prices were associated with a higher
number of lynchings of Blacks in the Southern states in the US. A re-analysis of this phenome-
non, taking account of a larger time period, failed to replicate this relationship between eco-
nomic performance and hostility towards minorities [41]. There is also work showing no
relationship between economic downturn or wealth of groups in society and support for politi-
cal parties with an anti-immigrant agenda. For example, Lubbers and Scheepers’ [31] analysis
of opinion poll data collected in different German regions between 1989 and 1998 shows that
there is no straightforward correlation between a region’s economic performance and support
for the anti-immigrant party, the Republikaner. Consistent with this, Hannah Arendt, in her
classic book ‘The Origins of Totalitarianism’ [42] points out that totalitarian movements devel-
oped in Germany and Italy, but not in the United Kingdom, despite the fact that both countries
suffered to the same extent from the consequences of the Great Depression ([42], p. 250–254;
see also [43]).
More interesting for our present purposes, research examining the electoral support for
Hitler’s National Socialists (NSDAP) in different regions of the Weimar Republic found that
support for the party was indeed strongest in depressed working-class regions (e.g. Thuringia)
but also in relatively affluent protestant rural areas such as Schleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg,
Pomerania and East Prussia [44]. Likewise, a study examining exceptionally high levels of sup-
port for the NSDAP in the city of Braunschweig in the early 1930s (between 36 and 36.6% of
the vote), revealed that support for the NSDAP was highest in the seven upper middle-class
precincts of the city, with levels of support ranging from 61% to 65.5% [45]. Similarly, Vanne-
man and Pettigrew [8] found that in Chicago, resistance to black mayor candidates was highest
among those who were fraternally deprived and among more affluent workers.
The notion that sometimes it is groups at the top of the hierarchy (i.e., high status groups)
that show most negative intergroup attitudes is also consistent with findings of a meta-analysis
by Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, and Hume [46]. Their research, conducted in both real-world
and laboratory settings, showed that high-status groups generally display more ingroup bias
than do low-status groups. It has also been found that higher status groups are more likely than
lower status groups to endorse group-based hierarchies and status-inequalities [47, 48], and
that those with greater wealth donate less generously, score lower in empathic accuracy, and
are less responsive to the needs of others than their poorer counterparts [49–52]. Similar effects
have been witnessed at the societal level (see [53], in press). In a study in which the state of the
national economy was experimentally manipulated, stronger anti-immigrant sentiments were
found when the national economy was presented as prospering rather than contracting. These
findings are also consistent with research testing Labor Market Competition Theory predic-
tions [54]. Researchers working in this research tradition have suggested that opposition to
immigration can be expected to be higher among the more skilled and the wealthier segments
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in society. This is because these groups are most concerned about increased immigration being
a burden on the public purse, and factor increasing pressure to raise taxes.
Other work suggests that these effects are most pronounced when high status group mem-
bers perceive their high status to be unstable or insecure. High status group members whose
status is threatened in this way might engage in status protection, or even oppression to avoid
losing their higher status. For example, Haslam [55] argues that under such conditions, high-
status group behavior is “likely to take a more sinister form and be reflected in ideologies (rac-
ism and sexism for example) that attempt to justify and rationalize the ingroup’s superiority
and the outgroup’s inferiority” (p.27). Consistent with this, Scheepers, Ellemers, and Sinte-
maartensdijk [56] showed experimentally that only high status groups who feared to lose their
status in the future displayed a stress response in the form of higher systolic blood pressure and
pulse pressure.
Similarly, Rios Morrison, Fast and Ybarra [57] found that members of high status groups
who were more highly identified with their group were only more likely to endorse inequality
between groups when they experienced high intergroup threat. More generally, sociologists
have argued that high-status groups perceive threats to their status position when they feel that
they might lose the concrete privileges to lower-status groups (e.g., [58, 59]). Indeed, it has
been argued that it is the fear that one compares negatively to other relevant groups, concerns
that others are climbing the ladder faster than oneself, or anxiety related to the belief that one’s
earlier economic gains might be lost that feeds discontent and hostility towards minorities
([60], see also [61]).
According to Blumer [58], prejudice arises when a privileged group develops fear that a
minority group is ‘getting out of place’ and ‘encroaches’ on benefits that are typically seen as
benefits of their group [59, 62]. In line with this notion, a study by Martinovic and Verkuyten
[63] found that endorsement of the belief that primo occupants are more entitled than those
arriving later (i.e., autochthony) was related to prejudice towards immigrants only for Dutch
natives who feared that they were losing their entitlements to newcomers.
In sum, realistic conflict theorizing may be popular and intuitively appealing, the empirical
evidence for the theory is rather mixed and inconclusive: negative attitudes towards minorities
have both been observed in times of economic hardship and in times of economic prosperity;
among members of low status groups as well as among those who belong to high status
groups. While realistic conflict literature accounts well for the finding that economic hardship
enhances harsh attitudes, theoretically, it cannot account for the finding that at times, we
appear to be particularly harsh towards minorities such as immigrants when our own eco-
nomic, financial and social status is relatively high, or when a society’s economy is booming.
How economic prosperity hardens attitudes
Researchers examining the so-called v-curve developed the notion that both relative depriva-
tion and relative gratification may underlie prejudice and negative attitudes towards minorities.
Specifically, negative attitudes towards minorities such as immigrants are predicted to be high-
est among those who experience relative deprivation (because of low status or economic hard-
ship in society) and among those who experience relative gratification (either because their
status is high or because they experience economic prosperity more generally, [9], see also [64].
There is now a large body of work that has provided empirical evidence in line with the v-
curve, both in real world contexts [65] as well as in more controlled experimental studies [9,
66, 11].
Previous research has offered a number of explanations for the finding that relative gratifi-
cation is associated with opposition to immigration and more intergroup discrimination.
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Dambrun and colleagues [65] reasoned that relative gratification enhances the attractiveness of
the ingroup, and this, so they argued, is associated with stronger intergroup dynamics, which
translate into more intergroup discrimination. Consistent with this, they found that group
identification partially mediated the relationship between relative gratification and negative
intergroup attitudes in South-Africa. Likewise, Postmes and Smith [11] found evidence for the
mediating role of group identification. Importantly however, in these studies it cannot be
argued that it is identification with the income group that is mediating the effect. Dambrun and
colleagues [65] measured identification in relation to participants’ ethnicity while relative grati-
fication was assessed in relation to personal economic conditions. Postmes and Smith [11]
manipulated relative gratification as favourable job prospects for university students while
identification referred to identification with Britain.
In a further exploration of processes underlying the v-curve, Guimond and Dambrun ([9],
Study 2) manipulated relative gratification by providing feedback that job prospects of the
ingroup were more favourable in the future than that of another comparison group. They
found the predicted v-cure but failed to find evidence that social dominance or mood mediated
the effect of relative gratification on prejudice and support for anti-immigrant policies. More
recently, Moscatelli and colleagues [66] identified two mediators underlying the relationship
between relative gratification and intergroup discrimination. First, relative gratification was
found to lead to a fear of losing ingroup advantage, and this in turn was associated with greater
intergroup discrimination. Second, relatively gratified groups were found to feel guilty about
the advantage they had over relatively deprived groups. The authors reasoned that such feelings
justified a “strike first” attitude, whereby intergroup discrimination is shown because the out-
group in question is expected to be biased against the relatively gratified ingroup responsible
for their deprived state.
While these lines of work provide some important insights into the mechanisms underlying
the effect of relative gratification on opposition to immigration, a few considerations lead us to
suspect that the mediation question has not yet been resolved. First, not all studies that exam-
ine the underlying processes are concerned with opposition towards immigration (or outcomes
that are related to this dependent variable). For instance, Moscatelli et al. [66] manipulated rel-
ative gratification of two groups in relation to one another. In their study, participants allocated
resources to their own privileged group and to the disadvantaged group. Even though this set-
ting enabled the researchers to gain a deeper understanding of competition between two rival
groups, it is not a proper test of the effects of gratification on hostility towards immigrants.
After all, immigrants (and in particular potential future immigrants) are not necessarily in
direct competition with privileged members of society. Thus, this work cannot help us to
understand how relative gratification shapes attitudes towards a third party (e.g., immigrants).
In order to make progress in this line of research, it is important to note an important differ-
ence. Whereas Moscatelli and colleagues found that guilt was an important mediator of the
relationship between relative gratification and intergroup discrimination, these effects are
probably restricted to contexts where relative gratification was achieved at the expense of the
outgroup [66]. In our research, we therefore measure and manipulate relative gratification
independently from the group to be evaluated (e.g., newcomers or immigrants).
Second, rather than examining consequences of present gratification, Guimond and Dam-
brun [9] manipulated relative gratification as the likelihood of future gratification (e.g., job
prospects for undergraduate students after finishing their degree) and are thus concerned with
the behaviour of prospective group members [11]. In our studies, we examine the effects of rela-
tive gratification as a current state, rather than as one that can be expected in the future. We
also build on this work by examining whether different forms of relative gratification (i.e., pres-
ent vs. future; personal versus group) relate differently to opposition to immigration.
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In an attempt to gain a better understanding of the processes underlying relative gratifica-
tion effects, we examine the mediating role of a number of different variables. First, similar to
Dambrun et al. [65] we explore the extent to which identification with the wealth group medi-
ates the effects of relative gratification on opposition to immigration. Second, we examine
whether relative gratification effects are mediated by collective self-definitions. Specifically, and
in line with stereotype content model [67, 68] we propose that the stereotype of the wealthy—
because of this group’s ability to acquire wealth—tends to revolve around attributes associated
with competence. However, wealthy groups are also seen as relatively cold (i.e. low in empa-
thy). These stereotypes are not just ways in which others perceive the affluent, they are also
internalized by the wealthy themselves as ways to understand the group’s identity, affecting the
content of group norms [11]. We expect that the relatively prosperous groups will self-stereo-
type as competent but cold, the more group norms will emerge that condone and justify hostil-
ity and opposition towards those aspiring to become part of society (i.e., immigrants).
Finally, we examine the extent to which relative gratification effects are due to so-called ‘fear
of falling’ [69]. In line with Moscatelli and colleagues [66] we predicted that with increasing
levels of relative wealth, anxiety related to the belief that one’s earlier economic gains might be
lost may feed discontent and hostility towards minorities [61]. This reasoning is consistent
with social identity theorizing that anxiety about the security of high status will enhance status
protection behaviour and enhance the motivation to justify the current status quo [55, 56, 70].
Overview of Research
We conducted four studies to examine support for our hypotheses. First, in all studies, we
examined support for the v-cure hypothesis. We predicted that compared to moderate levels of
wealth, lower and higher wealth will be associated with more opposition to immigrants and
towards immigration policies. In a first study, involving a Swiss referendum, we examined
whether percentages of votes in favour of curbing immigration would be higher in cantons that
are relatively poor and cantons that are relatively prosperous (compared to intermediate levels
of wealth). In Study 2, in an attempt to provide evidence for causality, we tested the same v-
curve prediction using an experimental paradigm where we systematically manipulated the
position of the group in the hierarchy (poor, moderately wealthy and wealthy).
In a third study, we examined whether features of the socio-structural context affect the
prevalence of the v-curve. Specifically, we examined whether the extent to which relative grati-
fication enhances opposition to immigration is affected by growing inequality in society.
Inequality has been associated with the perception that society is hostile, and, building on pre-
vious work that has shown that relative gratification is only associated with more hostility
towards immigrants when group norms condone such harshness [11], we predicted that the v-
curve will be more pronounced in conditions where societies face growing inequality between
wealth groups (compared to declining inequality).
In a final study, we examined the v-curve in a representative sample of Australians. This
study had several additional aims. First, we examined different forms of relative gratification
and examine for instance whether effects of past, current and future gratification on opposition
to immigration differ and whether perceived personal relative gratification effects are similar to
those of collective relative gratification. No strong predictions were formulated, but we were
open to the finding that because relative gratification is felt more strongly when it is a current
than an anticipated state, the former relative gratification form would be stronger predictor of
opposition to immigration than the latter. Furthermore, in line with classic reasoning that col-
lective level responses are best predicted by fraternalistic deprivation [71, 8], we expected that
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collective relative gratification (i.e., fraternalistic) would be a better predictor of opposition to
immigration than personal gratification (i.e., egoistic).
In addition, in this study we systematically examined support for the proposed mediators of
the relationship between collective relative gratification and opposition to immigration. We
focused on (1) wealth group identification, (2) collective self-definition as competent but cold,
and (3) fear for the future wealth of Australia as mediators to the relationship between relative
gratification and opposition to immigration.
Study 1
Ethics Statement
Because no data were collected among human participants, and because data were obtained
from publicly available data bases, it was not necessary to obtain ethical clearance for this
study.
Method
On February 9, 2014, a referendum was held in Switzerland asking the Swiss to vote on the
question whether they agreed (“yes”) or disagreed (“no”) that immigration into the country
should be curbed. A small majority of Swiss citizens (50.3%) agreed with the proposal requiring
the government to set an upper immigration limit. However, despite the acceptance of the pro-
posal nationally, levels of endorsement within the 26 cantons varied considerably with ‘only’
38.90% “yes” votes in Vaud and 68.20% “yes” votes in Ticino (see [72, 73] for more informa-
tion on this referendum).
A data set was created bringing together information on (a) anti-immigrant voting by can-
ton (we included the percentage “yes” votes, and the total number of “yes” votes) and (b)
indicators of the canton’s economic performance (we included 2 indicators: percentage unem-
ployment in the canton in 2013 and the canton’s relative disposable income in 2011).
Results
Descriptive statistics, bivariate correlations and partial correlations controlling for total num-
ber of votes in a canton and seats in the parliament can be found in Table 1. Inspection of the
partial correlations shows relative gratification relationships: a higher percentage of “yes” votes
was negatively correlated with unemployment, r (26) = -.50, p = .012, and positively correlated
with relative disposable income, r (26) = .57, p = .004. The relationship between percentage of
“yes” votes and the quadratic term for unemployment was also significant, r (26) = -.47, p =
.019, but non-significant for relative disposable income, r (26) = −049, p = .820. Inspection of
the curvilinear effect for unemployment showed that the percentage of “yes” votes was higher
in cantons with relatively low and relatively high levels of unemployment (compared to the
cantons with relatively moderate levels of unemployment).
Discussion
In sum, it was in cantons with relatively lower levels of unemployment and relatively higher
disposable income that the percentage of “yes” votes was higher. For the relationship between
percentage of “yes” votes and unemployment, we also found evidence of a v-curve whereby this
negative relationship was relatively speaking more pronounced in the poorer and the wealthier
cantons compared to the moderately wealthy cantons.
However, when exploring canton effects, the sample size is by definition small and this
affects the certainty with which we can draw conclusions. Furthermore, although this case
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study provides preliminary evidence for a v-curve, this evidence needs to be interpreted with
caution because a host of other variables could potentially have affected “yes” votes other than
those relating to unemployment and relative disposable income. Therefore, in Study 2 we used
an experimental design allowing us to assess whether relative deprivation and relative gratifica-
tion causes differences in opposition to immigration.
Study 2
We developed an experimental paradigm that would allow us to isolate effects and examine
causality. We again tested support for a v-curve between wealth and opposition to immigration
in an experiment in which participants joined a stratified virtual society, and were subsequently
asked for their attitudes towards ‘newcomers’ (i.e., immigrants) who would be joining their
society.
Participants and Design
Participants were 61 undergraduate students at a large Australian university (48 females, 13
males with an average age ofM = 18.82 years, SD = 2.81). Australian citizenship was a prereq-
uisite for participation in the study. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three wealth
conditions: as poor (i.e., lower than average wealth), moderate wealth, or above average wealth.
Ethics Statement
This study obtained ethical clearance from the Behavioural and Social Sciences Ethical Review
Committee (BSSERC) at the University of Queensland. Before completing the questionnaire,
participants were informed about the aims of the study. After this, they were informed that
continuing with the survey indicated (written) informed consent.
Procedure and measures
Participants were informed that they would become part of a virtual society, Bimboola, and
that they were starting a new life as a member of this society (for more information on the par-
adigm, please contact the first author). Participants read that, just like any other society, there
are differences in income within this society. They were informed that Bimboola consisted of 5
income groups, with group 1 earning less than 5,000 Bimbolian Dollars (BD) per year (below
the poverty threshold), group 2 earning between 5,000 and 10,000 BD, group 3 earning
Table 1. Descriptive statistics, bivariate correlations and partial correlations, votes to curb immigration by canton in Switzerland, Study 1.
M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. “Yes” votes (%) 52.55 (8.00) 1 -.50* -.47* .57** -.05
2. Unemployment (%) 2.54 (1.18) -.62** 1 — -.63** .18
3. Squared Unemployment (%) 7.81 (6.99) -.60** — 1 -.67** .25
4. Relative disposable income .53 (1.26) .71** -.72** -.75** 1 —
5. Squared Relative disposable income 1.82 (3.03) -.22 .28 .36 — 1
6. Total votes by canton 111860.85 (118841.66) .27 .28 .22 -.36 -.12 1
7. Seats in national parliament 7.69 (8.07) -.31 .31 .25 -.41* -.07 .99**
*p < .05
**p < .01
Bivariate correlations are presented below the diagonal. The partial correlation controlling for total number of ‘yes’ votes is reported above the diagonal.
Correlations are based on N = 26.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0139156.t001
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between 10,000 and 100, 000 BD per year, group 4 earning between 100,000 and 1 million BD
per year and group 5 earning more than 1 million BD per year. Participants were allocated to
income group 2, 3, or 4 and they were told that allocation was random. Income groups 1 and 5
were primarily included to provide a broader frame and to avoid that income group 2 and 4
would also be the poorest or the wealthiest within the society. In this study, participants were
allocated to income group 1and 5 but these results will not be further discussed because in
these conditions income level is confounded with an extreme income position (i.e., being at the
bottom or top of the wealth hierarchy).
Once participants knew which income group they belonged to, they were invited to start
their new life. Their first task was to purchase basic requirements such as a house, a car, and a
phone. When choosing a house, participants were shown pictures of houses ranging from old
and run-down dwellings to brand-new luxurious mansions. The houses on offer were displayed
on screen, and listed by income group (ranging from 1 to 5). Participants were advised that
they could only buy a house within or below their income bracket. The same procedure was
used when buying a car and phone. Participants were then told they had the opportunity to
select a holiday destination. Whereas the holiday options for income group 2 were quite basic
(e.g., camping or a day-trip to the beach), income group 3 could go on a 4-wheel drive adven-
ture, a week-long campervan trip, or a one week stay in a lakeside cottage. Participants in
income group 4 could choose from any of three more extravagant options such as a one-week
shopping trip to Paris.
Participants completed a manipulation check asking them to indicate to what extent they
agreed with the statements “my group is poor” and “my group is rich” on a 7 point scale rang-
ing from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree. Participants were then informed that a new
group (called newcomers) was about to join Bimboola. They were told that these newcomers
wanted to rebuild their lives in Bimboola and that they may need some assistance from existing
members of the community of Bimboola. After this, opposition to immigration by these new-
comers was measured. After completing all measures, participants were debriefed and thanked
for their participation.
Opposition to immigration. To measure opposition to immigration by the newcomers,
21 items measuring both symbolic (e.g., “The cultural practises of the new group will threaten
the Bimboolean way of life”) and realistic threat perceptions (e.g., “The presence of people
from this new group will increase unemployment in Bimboola”) and well as general items (e.g.,
“I think our group should not allow newcomers to Bimboola”) were included. Responses were
measured on a 7 point scale from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree (α = .91).
Results
Manipulation check. The two manipulation check items were combined after reverse
scoring the statement “I am poor” so that higher scores on this measure indicate the perception
that the own income group is wealthy (r = .77, p< .001). One-way analysis of variance on the
wealth manipulation check revealed that the experimental conditions differed significantly
from one another, F(2, 58) = 70.60, p<. 001. In line with the manipulations, above average
wealth income group participants agreed most with the statement that their group was rich
(M = 6.29, SD = .75), followed by moderately wealthy income group participants (M = 4.39,
SD = 1.01), followed by poor income group participants (M = 2.34, SD = 1.13). Post-hoc tests
confirmed that all conditions differed significantly from each other at p< .001.
Opposition to immigration. A one-way analysis of variance was set up testing the linear
as well as the curvilinear condition effect on opposition to immigration. The linear effect was
not significant, F(1, 58) = .07, p = .79, but the quadratic term was significant, F(1, 58) = 4.18, p
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= .045. Opposition to immigration was highest for the poor income group (income group 2,
M = 3.48, SD = .80) and the above average wealth income group (income group 4,M = 3.50,
SD = .73) and lowest for the moderately wealth group (income group 3,M = 3.03, SD = .91, see
Fig 1).
Discussion
In sum, results of Study 2 showed that the developed experimental design is effective in manip-
ulating wealth perceptions and that the own group’s wealth perceptions cause opposition to
immigration differences. Specifically, we found a v-curve relationship whereby it is those in
poor and above average wealth income groups who were most opposed to immigration com-
pared to those in a moderately wealth group.
Study 3
Taking Study 2 findings further, in Study 3 we examined the way the broader structural context
affects the v-curve, using a similar ‘new life’ experiment as used in Study 2. In particular, and
building on research by Postmes and Smith [11] who showed that the v-curve was only found
when the broader social context endorsed a hostile normative climate, we predicted that
inequality would amplify the v-curve. In line with findings that societal inequality is associated
with low trust, low cohesion, a harsher and more hostile society [74] and a perceived loss of
control [75]—all factors that impact on the perceived stability of wealth—we predict that in
particular those assigned to poor and above average wealth groups would be affected by the
instability that inequality brings (more so than those assigned to moderately wealth condi-
tions). Importantly, we manipulated perceived inequality in such a way that the level of wealth
of the participant’s own groups remained unchanged, thus making it possible to disentangle
effects of income and inequality.
Participants and Design
Participants were 151 MTurk workers (62 females, 89 males, with an average age ofM= 32.02
years, SD = 9.50). The design was a 3 (wealth) x 2 (growing or declining inequality). Wealth
Fig 1. Opposition to immigration as a function of income level, Means and Standard Errors, Study 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0139156.g001
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was manipulated at three levels: as lower than average wealth (income group 2), moderate
wealth (income group 3), and above average wealth (income group 4). Participants were ran-
domly assigned to conditions.
Ethics Statement
This study also obtained ethical clearance from the Behavioural and Social Sciences Ethical
Review Committee (BSSERC) at the University of Queensland. Before completing the ques-
tionnaire, participants were informed about the aims of the study. After this, they were
informed that continuing with the survey indicated (written) informed consent.
Procedure and measures
As in Study 2, participants were told that they would become part of a hypothetical society,
Bimboola. After they had been assigned randomly to one of three wealth groups in a five-
income group society, they were again asked to buy items that would help them to get started
in their new life. Participants were subsequently exposed to the growing or declining inequality
manipulation. Specifically, in the declining inequality condition, participants were told (grow-
ing income inequality condition in brackets) “Imagine that over the next 20 years, Bimboola
is affected by a change in economy. As a result, the wealth gap in Bimboolean society has
decreased (increased). Status differences have decreased (increased): the poor have become
richer (poorer), the moderately wealthy earn about the same, and the rich have lost some of the
wealth and become poorer (gained more wealth and become richer).” After this, participants
were also presented with a graphical representation of this change. Importantly, in the graph,
the wealth of the own income group was presented as unaffected over time and this was
emphasized in a clarifying note to the graph.
Participants then completed the same two-item wealth manipulation check as used in Study
2 (r = .69, p< .001). In addition, the growing versus declining inequality manipulation was
checked with four items. On 7 point scales ranging from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly
agree, participants were asked “Over time, the gap between the poor and the rich has become
wider in Bimboola”, “Over time, the gap between the poor and the rich has become narrower
in Bimboola”, “Over time, inequality between the income groups has increased in Bimboola”,
and “Over time, inequality between the income groups has decreased in Bimboola”. After
recording of the second and fourth item, responses on the four items were averaged with higher
scores indicating growing inequality perceptions (α = .93). To ensure that our inequality
manipulation had not also affected participants’ own wealth ratings, we added a question ask-
ing them to what extent they agreed that “the income of my group has stayed the same over
time”.
After this, participants were again informed that a new group (called newcomers) would be
joining Bimboola. After completing all measures, participants were debriefed, received a code
they used for payment and they were thanked for their participation.
Opposition to immigration. To measure opposition to immigration by the newcomers,
most of the items used in Study 2 were included and a few general opposition to immigration
items were added, totalling 20 items. Responses were again measured on a 7 point scale from 1
= Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree (α = .96).
Results
Manipulation check. A 3 (wealth) x 2 (growing or declining inequality) ANOVA on the
wealth check revealed a main effect for wealth, F(2, 147) = 72.81, p<. 001, η2 = .49. In line with
the manipulations, above average wealth income group participants agreed most with the
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statement that their group was rich (M = 5.88, SD = 1.11), followed by moderately wealthy
income group participants (M = 4.84, SD = .93), followed by poor income group participants
(M = 3.18, SD = 1.47). Post-hoc tests confirmed that all conditions differed significantly from
each other at p< .001. Albeit much weaker than the wealth condition effect, we also found a
main effect for inequality, F(1, 148) = 4.04, p = .046, η2 = .03, whereby participants in the grow-
ing inequality condition felt wealthier (M = 4.82, SD = 1.56) than those is the declining inequal-
ity condition (M = 4.45, SD = 1.68). It is possible this effect is the result of the graph that
participants were asked to study whereby there is a greater gap between the own group and the
poorest income group (income group 1) in the growing than in the declining inequality condi-
tion. However, this unexpected effect is small, and may well be a fluke effect. The interaction
between wealth and inequality was not significant, F(2, 147) = 2.14, p = .122, η2 = .03.
A similar ANOVA on the inequality check revealed only a main effect for inequality, F(1,
148) = 82.45, p< .001, η2 = .35. In line with the manipulation, participants perceived income
inequality to be higher in the growing inequality condition (M = 5.24, SD = 1.38), than in the
declining inequality condition (M = 3.06, SD = 1.64).
Finally, we found no significant effects of wealth or equality on the judgement whether
wealth had stayed the same over time, all Fs< 2.16, suggesting that the equality information
had not affected perceptions of own wealth differently across the conditions. In line with the
manipulations, participants perceived that their wealth had stayed the same (M = 6.09, SD =
.97) despite changes in the equality of society. In general, we found that the manipulation of
wealth and inequality worked as intended.
Opposition to immigration. Analysis of variance revealed that the linear effect for wealth
was not significant, F(1,148) = .12, p = .78, η2 = .03, but the quadratic term was significant, F
(1,148) = 5.34, p = .022, η2 = .04, providing evidence for a v-curve: Opposition to immigration
was highest in the poor income group condition (M = 4.39, SD = 1.25), and the above average
wealth group condition (M = 4.45, SD = 1.26). Opposition to immigration was lowest in the
moderate wealth income group (M = 3.93, SD = 1.17). We also found a significant effect of
inequality, F(1, 145) = 5.61, p = .019, η2 = .04. Opposition to immigration was higher in the
growing inequality condition (M = 4.47, SD = 1.21) than in the declining inequality condition
(M = 4.00, SD = 1.22). The interaction between income level and inequality was not significant,
F(2, 145) = .10, p = .91 (see Fig 2).
Fig 2. Opposition to immigration as a function of income level and societal inequality, Means and Standard Errors, Study 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0139156.g002
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Discussion
In sum, Study 3 replicated Study 2 findings and showed that participants in the poor and above
average wealth income groups were more opposed to immigration compared to those in a
moderately wealthy group. We also found that societal equality affected opposition to immi-
gration, but not in the way that we had expected. Whereas we had proposed that inequality
would amplify the v-curve because in particular participants in poor and above average wealth
conditions would perceive inequality as more threatening and anxiety provoking than those in
the moderately wealth condition, we found instead that participants in all three wealth groups
showed more opposition to immigration when their society was expected to become more
unequal compared to equal. Even though this finding was not predicted, it is in line with obser-
vations by Wilkinson and Pickett [74] that inequality affects everyone in society—the poor as
well as the wealthy. We will discuss this finding in greater detail in our General Discussion.
Finally, we also found that growing inequality led to a perception of being wealthier and
overall greater opposition to immigration than in the declining inequality condition. Even
though the higher wealth perceptions in unequal societies may be a result of the way inequality
was manipulated, the latter finding on opposition to immigration is consistent with a growing
body of work revealing the negative effects of societal inequality on tolerance and well-being
more generally (e.g., [76, 74]).
Study 4
Even though Studies 1 to 3 provide good evidence for a v-curve using both correlational and
experimental designs, it is not clear yet (a) what forms of relative gratification are most condu-
cive to promote opposition to immigration and (b) why this relationship emerges. These ques-
tions were the focus of the fourth and final study where we examined the relationship between
perceptions of relative gratification and opposition to immigration in an Australian commu-
nity sample. To address the first question, we examined a range of different indicators of rela-
tive gratification including personal level (i.e., gratification when considering own personal
wealth), and collective level relative gratification (i.e., gratification when considering Australia’s
wealth). In an attempt to assess whether effects of current relative gratification are similar to
effects of past and expected future relative gratification, for both personal and collective level
relative gratification, we also examined relative gratification relating to current wealth, current
wealth compared to the past, and expected future relative gratification. At the personal level,
we also included a measure of class as a relatively fixed indicator or relative gratification.
Finally, at both the collective and personal level, we examine the extent to which participants
felt relatively gratified when considering the threat posed by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC).
More specifically, we focused on whether participantsminimized the impact of the GFC
both personally and at the country level, either because they or their country had recovered
quickly from the GFC or had not been affected as much by it compared to other individuals or
countries.
Another important aim of Study 4 was to examine processes underlying relative gratifica-
tion. We examined the extent to which (1) identification, (2) collective self-definition as com-
petent but cold, and (3) fear for future wealth can account for the relationship between past,
present and future collective relative gratification and opposition to immigration.
Method
Participants. Participants were 621 Australian residents (326 females, 295 males) with an
average age of 40.90 (SD = 12.78, 7 missing values). In terms of ethnicity, 76.9% reported to be
White Caucasian, 15.8% were Asian, 1.4% were Middle Eastern, .8% were Aboriginal and/or
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Torres Strait Islander, and 3.9% ticked the ‘other’ category. To the question “what is your high-
est level of education”, 89 indicated they did not complete year 12, 101 completed year 12, 146
had a post-secondary qualification, 155 had finished an undergraduate degree and 117 partici-
pants held postgraduate qualifications (13 preferred not to say). Analyses revealed that control-
ling for ethnicity or education did not change the interpretation of the results reported below.
Ethics Statement. This study also obtained ethical clearance from the Behavioural and
Social Sciences Ethical Review Committee (BSSERC) at the University of Queensland. Before
completing the questionnaire, participants were informed about the aims of the study. After
this, they were informed that continuing with the survey indicated (written) informed consent.
Procedure and Measures. The study was part of a larger survey examining participants’
perceptions of their life in Australia and their views of Australian society more generally. Here,
we focus on a subset of measures. A professional research company (Taverner Research based
in Sydney) collected the data. Participants were sampled from the company’s research panel,
which covered all Australian states and territories.
Collective relative gratification. Collective relative gratification was measured with a
number of items that tapped different forms of relative gratification relating to collective
wealth. Specifically, we measured current, past and future gratification at the collective level
using the items: “Please think of the economic situation in Australia at the moment. How
would you describe the current economic situation in Australia?”, “Now please think about
Australia’s economic situation 3 years ago. To what extent would you describe Australia’s eco-
nomic situation three years ago to be worse, the same, or better than it is now? “and “Now
think about Australia’s economic situation in the next 3 years. To what extent do you expect
Australia’s economic situation to be worse, the same, or better in the next 3 years?” Responses
to the first item were recorded on a scale ranging from 1 = Very bad, to 7 = Very good. The
scale for the second and third item assessing past collective gratification and future collective
gratification ranged from 1 = A lot worse, to 7 = A lot better. Two items were included asking
about the extent Australia was unaffected and had recovered well from the Global Financial
Crisis: “Our country has already recovered quite well from the negative impact of the global
financial crisis”and “The effect of the global financial crisis on our country’s economy has been
negligible” (minimize impact of GFC, 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree, r = .49, p<
.001).
Personal relative gratification. Personal relative gratification was measured by asking
participants to indicate their level of satisfaction with their current personal financial situation
with the item “Please think of your personal economic situation at the moment. How would
you describe your current economic personal economic situation?” (current personal gratifica-
tion, 1 = Very bad, to 7 = Very good). We also asked participants about past and future personal
gratification with the items “Now please think at your personal economic situation 3 years ago.
To what extent would you describe your personal economic situation 3 years ago to be worse,
the same, or better than it is now?” and “Now think about your personal economic situation in
the next 3 years. To what extent do you expect your personal economic situation to worsen,
remain the same, or improve in the next 3 years?” (past personal gratification and future per-
sonal gratification, 1 = A lot worse, to 7 = A lot better). Finally, two questions asking about rela-
tive gratification as being personally unaffected or having recovered well from the Global
Financial Crisis: “The effect of the global financial crisis on my personal economic situation
has been negligible “and “I have personally already recovered quite well from the negative
impact of the global financial crisis” (minimize impact of GFC, 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 =
Strongly agree, r = .47, p< .001). We also added one item asking about participants’ social
class: “How do you perceive your own family’s class/social background?” (1 = Lower class to 7
= Upper class). As a measure of personal wealth, we also asked participants to record their
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annual household income. However, 40.5% of respondents indicated that they did not know or
did not want to provide this information. Given the high number of missing values, we decided
not to analyze responses to this measure.
Group identification. Four items, adapted from Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears [77] were
used to measure identification with Australia (7 point scale from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 =
Strongly agree). Higher values indicated more identification with the own income group
(α = .95).
Collective self-definition as competent and cold. Participants were asked to indicate on a
7-point scale from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree the extent to which they perceived
Australians to be warm (“warm”, “friendly”, “likeable”, “harsh”, “ruthless”, reverse coding of
the last two items), and competent [“competent”, “capable”, “weak” (reverse-coded)]. The reli-
ability of the warmth (α = .74), and competence scales (α = .64) was satisfactory.
Fear about future wealth. One item, adapted from Jetten and Wohl [78] was included to
gauge fear about future wealth at the collective level: “I feel anxious about the future wealth of
Australia”. We also included the other items of the collective angst scale that this item is taken
from. Similar effects were found for this scale as for the one item measure assessing fear about
the future wealth of the country.
Opposition to immigration. Opposition to immigration was measured using 6 items
assessing both realistic threat perceptions (e.g., “Immigrants take resources and employment
opportunities away from Australians”) and symbolic threat perceptions (e.g., “The cultural
practises of immigrants threaten the Australian way of life”). Responses were recorded on 7
point scales ranging from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree. Participants did not differ-
entiate between realistic and symbolic threat and we combined the items to form one scale,
α = .95.
Results
A series of curve estimation analyses were conducted exploring the extent to which each of the
collective and personal level relative gratification measures predicted opposition to immigra-
tion (see Table 2). Given the fact that we conducted multiple tests, a conservative significance
level of p< .01 was used.
Inspection of the linear and quadratic effects showed a number of significant relationships.
First, focusing on the collective relative gratification predictors of opposition to immigration,
only higher current collective relative gratification was linearly associated with lower opposi-
tion to immigration, β = -.17, p< .001. There was evidence for curvilinear relationships, such
that opposition to immigration was higher among those with lower and among those with
higher wealth levels (current collective gratification, β = .47, p = .01, future collective gratifica-
tion, β = .73, p< .001). Interestingly too, the quadratic term of minimizing the impact of the
GFC on Australia also predicted opposition to immigration: it was those who felt Australia had
not recovered from the GFC (relative deprivation) and those who felt Australia was hardly
affected by the GFC (relative gratification), minimizing the effects of the GFC that was associ-
ated with higher opposition to immigration, β = .49, p = .007.
There were also a number of significant relationships between different indicators of per-
sonal relative gratification and opposition to immigration. Specifically, higher current and
future personal relative gratification was linearly associated with lower opposition to immigra-
tion, β = -.10, p = .01 and β = -.18, p< .001, respectively. In both cases, the quadratic effect was
also significant. Similar to the collective level analyses, and in line with the v-curve hypothesis,
higher opposition to immigration was found for those that indicated lower and higher current
and future wealth, β = .65, p< .001 and β = .51, p = .002, respectively. Minimizing the personal
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effects of the GFC or class did not predict opposition to immigration, neither linearly nor cur-
vilinearly (see Table 2).
Mediators. A further series of curve estimation analyses were conducted examining the
power of (1) identification, (2) collective self-definition as competent and cold, and (3) fear for
the future wealth of Australia to explain the relationship between collective relative gratifica-
tion and opposition to immigration. These analyses were conducted using only present collec-
tive relative gratification measures. Results of these analyses are reported in Table 2.
Inspection of the linear relationship between collective relative gratification and each of the
mediators revealed a significant linear relationship for identification, β = .11, p = .006, collective
self-definition as competent, β = .13, p = .001, and fear for future wealth, β = -.23, p = .001. Col-
lective relative gratification was associated with higher identification, a higher collective self-
definition as competent and less fear for future wealth. Inspection of the curvilinear relation-
ships revealed only a significant effect for fear for future wealth, β = .76, p< .001. In other
words, it was those who were highest and those who were lowest in collective gratification that
feared most for the future wealth of Australia.
Further analyses revealed that only a few potential mediators predicted opposition to immi-
gration. Higher identification was linearly related to greater opposition to immigration, β = .16,
p< .001, and higher fear for the future wealth of Australia was linearly associated with higher
opposition to immigration, β = .26, p< .001.
Because only national identification (linearly) and fear for future wealth (linear and qua-
dratic) met the conditions for mediations, it was only these variables that were included as
mediators in bootstrap analyses [79] using 5000 resamples. This revealed that group identifica-
tion was not a significant mediator (IE = .03, SE = .012, 95% CI[-.003, .004]). However, fear for
future wealth (linear) turned out to be a significant mediator (IE = -.07, SE = .018, 95% CI
[-.121, -.107]). Importantly too for our purposes, the quadratic future wealth term was also a
Table 2. Results of curve estimation analyses predicting opposition to Immigration, and examinations of potential mediators, Study 4.
Predicting opposition to immigration Linear β Quadratic β
Collective level Relative Gratiﬁcation as predictor Linear β Quadratic β
M (SD)
Collective Relative Gratiﬁcation
Current 3.92 (1.37) -.17** .47*
Past 4.29 (1.32) -.04 .46
Future 3.80 (1.39) -.08 .73**
Minimize impact of GFC 4.31 (1.20) .07 .49*
Personal Relative Gratiﬁcation
Current 3.95 (1.53) -.10* .65**
Past 4.39 (1.39) -.04 .43
Future 4.18 (1.39) -.18** .51**
Minimize impact of GFC 4.11 (1.21) .00 .38
Class 4.09 (1.22) -.05 .26
Identiﬁcation 5.54 (1.35) .11* -.10 .16** -.10
Collective self-deﬁnition as warm 4.78 (.92) .09 -.36 .00 -.36
Collective self-deﬁnition as competent 5.00 (1.00) .13** .01 .04 .01
Fear for future wealth 4.86 (1.41) -.23** .76** .26** .76**
*p< .01
**p < .001
For the quadratic analyses, a positive beta indicates a v-curve, a negative beta indicates an inverse v-curve.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0139156.t002
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significant mediator (IE = -.07, SE = .019, 95% CI[-.126, -.111]), indicating that collective grati-
fication predicted opposition to immigration because, relatively speaking, it was those who
were highest and lowest in collective gratification that feared most for the future wealth of their
country.
Discussion
In sum, even though we found an overall negative relationship between relative collective grati-
fication and opposition to immigration in Australia, in addition to these linear effects we found
the predicted v-curve relationship between relative gratification and opposition to immigra-
tion. More specifically, we found evidence of a v-curve whereby the relationship between per-
ceived relative gratification and opposition to immigration was most pronounced for those
who felt collectively relatively deprived or relatively gratified at present or expected to feel so in
the future. A similar v-curve was found for the relationship between personal relative gratifica-
tion and opposition to immigration: it was those who felt relatively poor or wealthy at present
or in the future who were more opposed to immigration than those who felt moderately
wealthy. Interestingly too, we found that relative gratification by minimizing the negative
effects of the GFC on Australia also produced the predicted v-curve relationship. Oppose to
immigration to Australia was relatively high among those who denied and those who endorsed
the statement that these negative effects were no longer of concern.
Study 4 also provided evidence for the underlying processes. At the collective level, it was
only fear for the future wealth of Australia that mediated the relationship between collective
gratification and opposition to immigration. Interestingly, the relationship between collective
gratification and fear for the future wealth of Australia was curvilinear: it was those lower and
higher in relative gratification who feared future wealth decline of Australia. This finding is
consistent with findings by Moscatelli and colleagues [66] and suggests that relative gratifica-
tion, because it is associated with relative fear for the future wealth of Australia, predicts oppo-
sition to immigration.
General Discussion
We set ourselves the task of exploring whether there is evidence for a v-curve shaped relation-
ship between the economic performance of a group or society and opposition to immigration.
That is, we predicted that opposition to immigration would be highest among groups that are
relatively deprived and poor as well as among those with above average wealth (i.e., relatively
gratified). We found evidence for such a relationship in four studies that examined support for
the v-curve in different contexts and using different research designs.
In Study 1, we found that voting in favour of a national policy to curb immigration was
highest in Swiss cantons where unemployment was lowest and highest (a v-shaped curvilinear
relationship). Even though we only found a positive linear relationship and not the predicted
curvilinear relationship between canton relative disposable income and voting in favour of this
anti-immigration policy, the failure to find evidence for a v-curve was due to the failure to find
greater support for this policy among the poorest cantons, not because of the lack of support
for higher levels of endorsement of the policy in the wealthier cantons. Even though this find-
ing supports relative gratification theorizing [9, 11] it is at odds with classic relative deprivation
reasoning [15, 17].
Studies 2 and 3 examined the v-curve using an experimental design. Here too, we found that
in both studies opposition to ‘newcomers’ joining a hypothetical society was higher among
poor and above average wealth group members than among those in a moderate wealth group
condition. Finally, in a cross-sectional study, in line with the v-curve hypothesis, opposition to
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immigration spiked for those who experienced lower and higher personal or collective levels of
current and future wealth. We also found a v-curve between minimizing the effects of the GFC
at the collective level and opposition to immigration. In sum, across the four studies, we found
consistent support for the v-curve, whereby both wealth deprivation and wealth gratification
are associated with greater support for policies aimed at curbing immigration (Study 1), greater
opposition to immigration by newcomers to a hypothetical society (Studies 2 and 3), and
greater opposition to immigrants seeking to migrate to Australia (Study 4).
Implications
In order to better understand the processes underlying the v-curve and the conditions under
which outgroup hostility will be most pronounced, it is useful to review other findings that
emerged from the studies. First, in our examination of the way societal inequality affects the v-
curve (Study 3), we did not find (as predicted) that the v-curve would be more pronounced with
growing than with declining inequality. Instead, in addition to a v-curve, we found that all
wealth groups became more opposed to immigrants when inequality was growing rather than
declining. This finding is interesting and suggests that growing inequality is equally threatening
for those at the bottom, middle or top of a wealth hierarchy. The finding is consistent with
observations by political scientists and sociologists that growing inequality leads to greater status
competition whereby everyone experiences greater status instability and status anxiety [50,74].
Whereas the finding for growing inequality effects is interesting and consistent with Post-
mes and Smith’s findings ([11], Study 2), equally interesting (and inconsistent with ([11],
Study 2) is that we still found evidence for a v-curve among participants who were informed
that inequality in their society was declining. It may be that the way we manipulated declining
inequality is responsible for this finding. In our declining inequality condition, income differ-
ences between groups became smaller and this may have threatened distinctiveness between
the income groups. There is a large body of work showing that threats to distinctiveness leads
to a motivation to restore intergroup distinctiveness, often by showing enhanced intergroup
discrimination towards other groups [80–82]. The extent to which distinctiveness threat asso-
ciated with smaller differences between income groups enhanced perceived competition for
those who felt relatively gratified should be examined in future research.
Second, in an attempt to better understand what forms of relative gratification are associ-
ated with opposition to immigration, in Study 4 we examined the relationship between collec-
tive and personal relative gratification as well as the relationship between current, expected
future and past relative gratification with opposition to immigration. Interestingly, past relative
gratification (i.e., perceiving that personal and collective wealth was higher in the past than in
the present) did not predict opposition to immigration. However, and in line with the v-curve
hypothesis, opposition to immigration was highest for those who experienced high personal
and/or collective levels of current and future relative gratification. We can only speculate why
current and expected relative gratification predicted opposition to immigration whereas tem-
poral comparisons with past wealth did not. We suspect that a sense of current and expected
future gratification is associated with greater wealth stability [70] and that this may feed into a
sense of deservingness or entitlement [58, 59] thereby justifying the exclusion of immigrants.
In contrast, awareness that one was less wealthy in the past than the present may evoke a sense
of humbleness, reminding people that they were once less well-off themselves, and this should
attenuate hostility and prejudice. However, these are speculative suggestions that should be
tested in future research.
We also found that relative gratification emerging from a sense that one’s country is rela-
tively more robust against the global financial crisis than other countries also predicted
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opposition to immigration. This should serve as a reminder that it is not so much absolute
wealth, but feeling wealthier than others that matters when predicting outcomes of relative
gratification [65, 9].
It is interesting that we found that both personal and collective level gratification predicted
opposition to immigration. Even though this appears to go against classic reasoning that collec-
tive level outcomes are predicted by collective level processes relating to fraternalistic instead of
egoistic deprivation or gratification perceptions [71, 8], it may well be that these judgements
are not always all that different. Indeed, because self-definition is in important ways defined by
group membership, perceptions of personal achievement are often bound up with the position
of ones group in society [70, 8].
Finally, Study 4 provided insight in the processes underlying the relationship between rela-
tive gratification and opposition to immigration. Even though self-definitions as competent
predicted more opposition to immigration, we did not find that relative gratification was asso-
ciated with greater competence. We also found no support for the idea that self-definitions as
competent triggered self-definitions of being cold. Indeed, self-definitions as warm/cold were
not related to either relative gratification or opposition to immigration. It may well be the case
that we would find more support for a mediating role of self-definitions as competent and cold
in context where wealth is attributed to competence (e.g., within organisations or when people
are able to secure upward mobility by joining higher classes in society). We suspect that
under such conditions wealth may trigger feelings of deservingness and entitlement and these
may also be the conditions where groups will self-define as cold, both providing some moral
justification for holding negative attitudes of immigrants. This should be examined in future
research.
We found no support for the prediction that group identification mediates the relationship
between relative gratification and opposition to immigration (contrary to [9]). Even though
relative gratification predicted identification with Australia linearly, and identification, in turn,
predicted higher opposition to immigration, bootstrapping analysis showed that identification
did not mediate this relationship. Theoretically, this is not surprising. The prediction that
greater commitment to the group enhances opposition to immigration is based on the assump-
tion that group identification is positively correlated with ingroup bias and outgroup prejudice.
While this may be true in certain contexts, some have warned against assuming a straightfor-
ward relationship between the two [83]. For example, there is evidence that group identifica-
tion only promotes ingroup bias to the extent that this is normatively prescribed in a group
[81].
We did however find that fear for future wealth mediated the relationship between relative
gratification and opposition to immigration and accounted for the observed v-curve. What this
suggests is that relative gratification is associated with fear that future wealth may be lost and it
is this ‘fear of falling’ notion [69] that helps to explain why those who feel relatively gratified
become more negative towards minorities such as immigrants. Opposition to immigration
thus results from anxiety and fear that the relative gratified position may be lost in the future,
and this undermines the security of the wealth position. Our findings thus echo research show-
ing that for high status groups, status instability and insecurity can lead to a stress response
[56] and increased discriminatory behaviour in intergroup settings, ([46], see also [55]).
Limitations and future research
Our studies are not without limitations and they raise new questions to be examined in future
research. First, we suggest that it may be instructive to examine the effects of societal inequality
in greater depth in future research. Interestingly, our findings suggest that everyone becomes
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harsher when income inequality grows compared to when income inequality declines. How-
ever, because we needed to ensure that the income of the own wealth group did not change
with growing or declining inequality (so that our wealth manipulation would not be con-
founded with our inequality manipulation), our inequality manipulation may also have been
rather weak. This is because the stability of the own group wealth may have taken away some
of the uncertainty that everyone experiences when boundaries between groups become more
permeable due to growing inequality, and when all wealth groups start to fear for their future
wealth. This too should be explored in future work, whereby societal inequality should be
manipulated in different ways.
It is also essential in future research to examine the processes underlying growing societal
inequality effects. Indeed, while the effects of inequality have been well documented [74], less
progress has been made in understanding why inequality is associated with such negative out-
comes. The paradigm that was presented in Studies 2 and 3 might be useful to examine these
underlying processes experimentally.
As a final suggestion for future research, we note that we found evidence for the v-curve in
contexts dominated by relative gratification relationships in Study 1 (i.e., there was a linear pos-
itive relationship between relative disposable income and anti-immigrant votes) but relative
deprivation relationships in Study 4 (i.e., a negative linear relationship between current and
future collective relative gratification and opposition to immigration). Put differently, evidence
for the v-curve was found against the backdrop of a general relative gratification effect (Study
1) and a general relative deprivation effect (Study 4). This suggests that in most contexts, multi-
ple processes may be at play at once, simultaneously co-determining the relative strength of
prejudice and hostility due to relative deprivation (e.g., realistic conflict, competition over
resources) as well as relative gratification related processes (e.g., anxieties and fear that wealth
will be lost). These processes may differ from laboratory to natural context due to a host of
extraneous factors, making it very difficult to predict a priori which process will dominate or to
make strong claims about the generalizability of findings. This reasoning is consistent with
observations that there is no straightforward relationship between economic downturns and
opposition to immigration [43, 31, 13] and that what is required is great sensitivity to the con-
text and the socio-structural context that may help to inform researchers which processes will
dominate. But notwithstanding these variations in the tilt of the v-curve pattern across con-
texts, it should be noted that in none of these studies was the curvilinear effect reversed. In
other words, we are satisfied with the robustness of the underlying effect.
Final thoughts
Although our work is not the first to demonstrate the v-curve empirically, by examining this
relationship in new ways, we have advanced our understanding of the way economic perfor-
mance of a group affects opposition to immigration. We contribute to this body of work by
providing correlational as well as experimental evidence for the v-curve, by examining different
forms of relative gratification and by providing greater clarity on the processes underlying the
relationship between relative gratification and opposition to immigration. Although wealth
undoubtedly reduces certain kinds of stress, we find that relative gratification and wealth also
triggers fears that wealth will be lost in the future. Ironically, then, the perception that one is
relatively wealthy is therefore not always more comfortable than the perception that one is rela-
tively deprived. In some sense, relative gratification and relative deprivation are not the polar
opposites they might seem to be. Feelings of gratification might be pleasing and comfortable at
one level, but like all delights such relative advantages might well bring latent insecurities of
loss and fears of decline.
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